Private Speech as Social Action by Eric Hauser
国立大学法人電気通信大学 / The University of Electro-Communications












Final prepublication version of: 
Hauser, E. (2015). Private speech as social action. Language and Sociocultural Theory, 
2, 119-138. 
 
Private Speech as Social Action 
 
Eric Hauser 
University of Electro-Communications 
 
Abstract 
An important theoretical construct within the Vygotskian sociocultural approach to 
second language learning is private speech. Within a conversation-analytic framework, 
an agnostic stance is taken in this paper toward the possible intrapsychological 
function(s) of private speech in order to 1) illustrate how private speech can be 
identified within the details of talk-in-interaction and 2) how private speech can be 
understood as social action. It is argued that attention to the details of how private 
speech is produced is important in order to show how private speech has been identified 
as such; that viewing private speech as social action allows for a more emic perspective; 
and that, at least within interaction, private speech is social not just in origin, but each 
time that it is produced. 
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    Within the Vygotskian sociocultural approach to second language (L2) 
learning (Lantolf, 2000, 2011; Lantolf and Thorne, 2006), private speech is an 
important theoretical construct. Drawing on Vygotsky’s discussions of how children 
appear to use language to mediate or regulate their behavior during the performance of 
cognitively challenging tasks (Lantolf, 2000), researchers within this approach are 
interested in whether and how L2 learners can use L2 private speech to regulate their 
performance during such activities as picture-narration tasks (see Lantolf and Thorne, 
2006, and McCafferty, 1994a, for extensive discussion). As stated by McCafferty 
(1994a), ‘a Vygotskian view of private speech affords a valuable window onto the 
intrapersonal processes in which adult L2 learners engage in their efforts to self-regulate 
in the face of the very complex process of learning a second language’ (434). In 
addition, learners may also use private speech to focus attention on, and manipulate L2 
forms, which may facilitate internalization of those forms (Lantolf, 2003; Lantolf and 
Thorne, 2006). Lantolf and Yáñez-Prieto (2003) and Ohta (2001), for instance, used 
personal microphones to record the talk of students in university language (Spanish and 
Japanese, respectively) classrooms that presumably was not audible to either other 
students or the teacher and found that the learners used private speech in just this way. 
Within the Vygotskian approach, then, private speech is argued to make the process of 
L2 learning at least partially observable (Lantolf, 2003). 
One important issue in research on private speech is whether and how it can 
be distinguished from talk used for interpersonal communication, that is, social speech 
(Donato, 2000; Wells, 1999). True to the Vygotskian perspective on the genesis of 
intrapersonal psychological functions within interpersonal social interaction, private 
speech is seen as having social origins (Alarcón-Rubio, Sánchez-Medina, and Winsler, 
2013; Antón and DiCamilla, 1999; Damianova, Lucas, and Sullivan, 2012; DiCamilla 
and Antón, 2004; Lantolf, 2000), which may make it appear in some cases similar to 
social speech (Antón and DiCamilla, 1999; DiCamilla and Antón, 2004). In some 
studies (e.g., Lantolf and Yáñez, 2003; Ohta, 2001), private speech appears to be 
identified primarily on the basis of its supposed inaudibility to others. In other studies 
(e.g., Lee, 2008; Stafford, 2013), all talk (and in the Lee study, gesture as well) seems to 
be identified as private speech based on the fact that the participants were working 
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alone.1 In other cases, which involve learners engaged in more interactive tasks, 
distinguishing private speech from social speech seems to be much more complicated. 
In McCafferty (1994b), for example, which involved a picture-narration task, three 
criteria were used to identify private speech, namely, that it was ‘tangential to the 
narrative’ (123), involved an‘effort to seek self-guidance’ (123) and was ‘concerned 
with mastering some task-relevant difficulty’ (123). As a second example, while Antón 
and DiCamilla (1999) are not particularly clear about their criteria, DiCamilla and 
Antón (2004), a study which seems to draw on a larger version of the dataset used for 
the earlier study, state that they ‘relied on an analysis of linguistic, paralinguistic, and 
discursive features of the utterances that more clearly reveal their self-directed nature in 
the contexts of the discourse’ (41, emphasis in the original). Smith (2007) identified as 
private speech utterances which involved some sort of prosodic shift and ‘were not 
explicitly social’ (345). Moving to recent research on private speech that does not 
involve L2 learning, San Martín Martínez, Boada i Calbet, and Feigenbaum (2011) 
identified an utterance as private speech if it included ‘audible verbal elements and/or 
silences that were not explicitly directed at another person and that indicated 
self-regulation’ (222); Damianova, Lucas, and Sullivan (2012) used only a negative 
criterion to identify private speech as any utterance that could not be identified as social 
speech, based on linguistic and nonlinguistic cues; and similarly, Alarcón-Rubio, 
Sánchez-Medina, and Winsler (2013) identified as private speech ‘any verbalization ... 
not explicitly addressed to another person’ (103) based on such linguistic and 
nonlinguistic cues as pronoun reference, gaze, and volume. 
As argued by Wells (1999) and Steinbach Kohler and Thorne (2011), though, 
and against the claims of Antón and DiCamilla (1999), Damianova, Lucas, and Sullivan 
(2012), DiCamilla and Antón (2004), and San Martín Martínez, Boada i Calbet, and 
Feigenbaum (2011), it may be that in social interaction, private and social speech cannot 
be clearly distinguished and that an instance of talk may be both simultaneously. From a 
more theoretical perspective, Larrain and Haye (2012) argue that all inner speech, of 
which private speech is considered a subtype, reflects its origins in social speech in 
being a kind of discourse which ‘is not different in nature to “public” language’ (17).2 
Goffman (1981), in a passage that I have not seen discussed in any of the work on L2 
private speech, has this to say about the apparently private speech produced by the 
children that Vygotsky observed in his research: 
Given that Vygotsky’s early work required an adult observer to be 
within listening distance, one could go on to suggest an additional 
interpretation, namely that for children the contingencies are so 
great in undertaking any task, and the likelihood so strong that they 
will be entirely discounted as reasonably intentioned persons if 
they fail (or indeed that they will be seen as just idling or fooling 
around anyway), that some voicing of what they are about is 
something they are always prepared to offer. An adult attempting to 
learn to skate might be equally self-talkative. (95--96) 
That is, even talk which is clearly addressed to the self may nevertheless be targeted at 
others, to show for example that the speaker is ‘reasonably intentioned,’ and may thus 
involve a kind of social action.3 That private speech can be viewed as social action is the 
central claim of this paper. 
    The concept of social action has a long history in sociology and is perhaps 
most strongly associated with Parsons (e.g., Parsons, 1937). There are various senses in 
which language use can be viewed as social action (Holtgraves, 2002), but the sense in 
which I use the concept draws on Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis (CA) 
(Garfinkel, 1967; Hayano, 2013; Heritage, 1984; Heritage and Stivers, 2013; Maynard, 
2013; Pomerantz and Fehr, 1997; Sharrock and Button, 1991; Stivers, 2013; Wooffitt, 
2005). This means, first, that social actions are designed for their context, both at the 
local sequential level (Heritage, 1984; Heritage and Stivers, 2013; Maynard, 2013; 
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Pomerantz and Fehr, 1997) and at the broader level of event, activity, and participants 
(Heritage, 1984; Pomerantz and Fehr, 1997). Much work in CA focuses on how social 
actions are responsive to prior actions and/or set up relevancies for subsequent actions, 
that is, how they are organized as parts of adjacency pairs (Hayano, 2013; Stivers, 
2013). However, this is not the only way in which social actions implemented through 
talk can be designed for their local context. Second, social actions shape the context in 
which they occur, again at the local as well as the broader level (Heritage, 1984; 
Pomerantz and Fehr, 1997). Third, though they may flout social norms, the design of 
social actions shows participants’ orientations to such norms (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 
1984; Wooffitt, 2005). Finally, social actions are designed to be recognizable (Garfinkel, 
1967; Heritage, 1984; Sharrock and Button, 1991), though this should not be taken to 
mean that people do not perform actions which are intended to deceive, nor that 
participants’ understanding of what an action is cannot be revised (Heritage, 1984). The 
recognizability of social actions has particular import for research on private speech, as 
this is relied on to identify instances of such speech. 
    That private speech during interactive tasks can have a social component has, 
of course, been recognized by those working within the Vygotskian theoretical 
framework. While this often seems limited to a recognition that it is produced in the 
presence of others (Lantolf, 2000), that ‘a socially stimulating context is crucial for the 
elicitation of private speech’ (Damianova, Lucas, and Sullivan, 2012: 447), or that it 
builds ‘a sense of cooperation’ (McCafferty, 1994a: 429) or ‘collective externalization 
of metacognitive strategies’ (McCafferty, 1994a: 430), it has also been recognized that 
social context may influence the choice of language for private speech (Lantolf, 2003). 
In addition, Smith (2007), while still arguing that private speech can be distinguished 
from social speech, provides examples to show ‘that private speech can be responded to 
by others as if it were social in social interactive contexts’ (348). At least one study has 
focused explicitly on the social aspects of private speech. Steinbach Kohler and Thorne 
(2011) argue that private speech cannot be dissociated ‘from broader processes of social 
interaction’ (70) and show how participants can use private speech ‘as a resource for 
managing interaction’ (77), how private speech can emerge as the result of some kind of 
misalignment among participants, and how private speech can index ‘an agreement to 
disattend copresent parties’ (86). 
Similar to Steinbach Kohler and Thorne (2011), in this paper I attempt to 
show, through analysis of two examples, how talk produced by a relatively 
low-proficiency L2 learner of English, which is hearably self-directed and concerned 
with overcoming difficulty in producing an L2 utterance, and thus identifiable as private 
speech within the Vygotskian theoretical framework, can also be understood as a social 
action in a much more fundamental sense than has generally been recognized within 
this framework. It is not my intention to claim that private speech, including the private 
speech in my two examples, does not have a self-regulating function or play a role in 
the internalization of L2 forms. Rather, I adopt an agnostic stance toward the 
intrapersonal psychological function(s) of this talk, including whether talk can provide a 
window onto psychological processes. With such an agnostic stance, my analysis is not 
framed within sociocultural theory. Instead, I make use of CA to unpack the data. 
Below, after first describing the source of the data, the participants, and the transcription, 
I analyze how part of the talk in the two extracts is identifiable as private speech, in that 
it is self-directed talk, or self-talk (Goffman, 1981; Goodwin, 1987), as it will be 
referred to from hereon, and oriented toward overcoming difficulty with using the L2. I 
then show how the same talk is also identifiable as social action. My purpose in doing 
so is to criticize the Vygotskian view of private speech, but rather to engage with this 
view from a perspective that focuses on private speech as interpersonal rather than, or in 




    The data are drawn from audiorecordings between myself (Eric) and a male 
adult first language (L1) user of Japanese, called Nori (pseudonym), that were made 
over a period of seven months. At the time of the first recording, Nori had just recently 
immigrated to Honolulu from Tokyo with his wife and two daughters, who were in 
elementary school. His English proficiency was fairly limited, though he was attending 
free adult school ESL classes. In order to provide him with opportunities to practice 
using English, Nori and Eric agreed to meet at Eric’s apartment periodically to speak 
English. Nori also gave consent for these meetings to be recorded for research purposes. 
Eric was an L1 user of English and a proficient L2 user of Japanese, who had lived, 
studied, and worked in Japan for over seven years before coming to Honolulu for 
graduate school. Nori knew that Eric was proficient in Japanese and the two of them 
typically used Japanese whenever they conversed outside these meetings. Eric 
occasionally prepared some simple referential communication tasks (Yule, 1997) that 
took up a few minutes of meeting time, as in the first example below, and Nori 
sometimes brought things that he had questions about. However, most of the meeting 
time was used for unplanned conversation, as in the second example below. The data 
were collected in order to investigate L2 development longitudinally and I have used 
them that way in other work (e.g., Hauser, 2013a, b). However, for this paper, I will not 
be making any longitudinal comparisons. There is one final point about the collection of 
these data which is important to clarify. Though the data were collected in order to 
conduct longitudinal investigations, the data collection was also opportunistic. The data 
were not collected as part of a preplanned research project and the meetings did not 
involve, for example, attempts to elicit particular types of language. Nevertheless, such 
things as ‘practicing English’ and ‘recording Nori’s English for research’ are features of 
the broader context, which may be treated as relevant by the participants. 
The data have been transcribed based on conventions commonly used in CA 
(Jefferson, 2004). Japanese words have been transcribed in italics, with a 
morpheme-based translation on the line below. See the appendix for transcription 
conventions and symbols used to translate Japanese words. Through analysis of two 
excerpts from these data, I show, first, how some of Nori’s talk can be identified as 
private speech. I then show how this private speech can be understood as social action. 
Private Speech as Articulation of Explicit L2 Grammar Knowledge 
Searching for the Superlative Form 
    In the first example, Nori and Eric are engaged in a referential communication 
task that involves Nori looking at a card that has a picture of something, such as an 
animal or a tool, and describing it so that Eric can guess what it is. Nori approaches this 
task as involving the giving of a series of hints. For the card that Nori is looking at 




01 N: o:ld old animal. 
02 (0.5) 
03 E: [old animal? 
04 N: [ah: 
05 N: old animal. yeah. 
06 (1.2) 
07 N: yeah big. (.) big animal. .hh 
08 E: mhm, 
09→N: uh:: maybe uh::: (.) first uh (0.5) °big ↓bigger° 
10→  (.) biggest. .h hhm .h  [biggest   ] (0.2)= 
11 E:               [the biggest ] animal? 
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12 N: =manimal. .h n: .h (demo ne f:) (.)  [no :  := 
                (but   IP) 
13 E:                       [>like a-< 
14 N: = [n. 
15 E:  [like an elephant? 
16 (0.5) 
17 N: ele- ↑no. (.) moh- °m::° more- more- (.) .h (0.6) 
18→  o:l- (0.4) old o(h)- (.) olde(h)st. .h oldest 
19   animal. 
20 E: thee oldest animal? 
21 N: yeah_ .hhh (1.6) big ↓animal. ↑no .hh (0.6) 
22   no livu= 
23 E: =(here-) n. 
24 N: °n::° not .hh (0.4) n::ot lih- °n::° live world. 
25   ↑ah chigau na. °ima n-° (0.2) 
       different   IP      now 
26 E: it doesn’t live now? 
27 (0.2) 
28 N: yeah ↑not live now. 
29 E: oh okay 
 
    Nori gives his first hint (‘old old animal’) in line 01. When Eric repeats this as 
‘old animal,’ with rising intonation, in line 03, Nori confirms the repetition in line 05. 
However, Eric does not attempt to guess what the picture is of and Nori does not 
immediately give a second hint, leading to a fairly long gap in line 06. Nori then offers 
a second hint in line 07 (‘big … big animal’) and then starts to elaborate on this hint in 
line 09. The elaboration of this second hint is eventually articulated as ‘biggest … 
animal’ in lines 10 and 12. However, before he says this, Nori clearly encounters 
difficulty. He repeats ‘uh,’ often in elongated form, three times and pauses twice in line 
09. As for his use of ‘first’ in this line, it can be understood retrospectively as the start 
of a translation of the Japanese ‘ichiban ookii’ (literally, ‘number one big’). After this 
‘first,’ the third ‘uh,’ and a half-second pause, he then says quietly (noted in the 
transcript by the degree signs) ‘big bigger,’ with a noticeable drop in pitch on ‘bigger’ 
(noted by the down arrow). After a third brief pause, Nori then says ‘biggest’ with 
falling intonation. After some breathy sounds, he articulates ‘biggest … animal’ (with 
‘animal’ sounding more like ‘manimal’). However, it is not so simple, as ‘biggest’ is 
produced in overlap with Eric’s ‘the biggest’ (line 11) and Eric says ‘animal’ during the 
pause in Nori’s talk, which may have prompted Nori to add the word ‘animal.’ 
    When Nori says ‘big bigger … biggest,’ he is verbalizing grammatical 
knowledge of English which he possesses by virtue of being an L2 user of English, 
knowledge which he may have learned in secondary school English classes in Japan 
and/or in his ESL classes at adult school. Specifically, this is knowledge of the 
comparative and superlative forms of adjectives, which in some English language 
classrooms with a focus on grammar, such as those in Japanese secondary school, and 
in some commercial English language textbooks, such as the one Nori is using at adult 
school, is presented and taught as three-part lists (Jefferson, 1990); that is, as ‘big, 
bigger, biggest’ (or ‘good, better, best,’ ‘interesting, more interesting, most interesting’). 
By verbalizing this particular three-part list, Nori is led, or rather, leads himself, to the 
form he wants, which is the superlative form. This verbalization is thus oriented to 
overcoming difficulty using the L2 and, indeed, leads to a successful solution of this 
difficulty. The articulation of this list of adjective forms also appears to be self-talk, as 
the first two items are produced with a notably lowered volume and the second item is 
produced with lowered pitch as well. The third item is produced with normal volume 
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and with falling intonation, which commonly indicates some sort of completion, so that 
this list is complete both structurally, in that it has three parts, and intonationally. Nori, 
though, does not orient to turn transition, as indicated by the audible breathy sounds, 
including two inbreaths, following the third item. Such an inbreath, when it follows 
one’s own possibly complete talk, is indicative of intention and preparation to continue 
speaking and Nori does indeed continue following these sounds. The falling intonation 
and three-part structure can thus indicate that the list is complete, but not that Nori 
expects a response from Eric at this point. Eric also orients to this as self-talk as he does 
not respond to the first two items and only responds to the third after some delay. That 
is, he does not initially treat the falling intonation on the third item as an indication that 
Nori has completed his turn and that he should respond. For these reasons, Nori’s ‘big 
bigger … biggest’ can be considered an example of private speech. 
    Something very similar happens as the interaction continues. After Eric 
makes a guess in line 15 (‘like an elephant’), marked as a candidate answer with rising 
intonation, Nori first rejects this in line 17 (see Hauser, 2013b, for what is termed x-no 
negation and its use by Nori for correction) and, eventually, elaborates on his earlier 
first hint by saying ‘oldest animal’ in lines 18 and 19. Again, though, he experiences 
difficulty as he tries to make this elaboration. In line 17, he makes four attempts to use 
‘more,’ with three of these being cut off (indicated by the hyphens) and one being 
merely a softly articulated and elongated ‘m’ sound. After a brief pause, an inbreath, a 
longer pause, an attempt to say ‘old,’ and another pause, he apparently articulates 
another three-part list of adjective forms, ‘old older … oldest,’ though the second item 
is obscured by laughter (indicated by the letter h in parentheses). Once more, by 
articulating this three-part list of adjective forms, Nori leads himself to the superlative 
form, which he then uses in ‘oldest animal,’ to which Eric responds with ‘the oldest 
animal’ said with rising intonation. While the items that make up this list of adjective 
forms are not produced with noticeably lower volume, as with the earlier list, neither 
Nori nor Eric treat the structural completeness of the list or the falling intonation on 
‘oldest’ as indicating that Nori has said something for which a response can be expected 
from Eric. Instead, Nori produces an inbreath before producing ‘oldest animal’ and Eric 
waits until Nori has articulated the utterance before responding. Once again, then, this 
three-part list of adjective forms can be understood as self-talk used to overcome some 
difficulty with the L2, and thus merits the status of private speech. 
 
Searching for the Correct Pronoun 
    In the second example, Nori and Eric have been talking about surfing and the 
fact that the waves have been high recently. Eric has commented that according to the 
surf report, the waves are smaller today. 
Example 2 
01 N: n s’koshi. ↑demo  [.hh 
      little     but 
02 E:            [yeah little bit smaller 
03   [today. 
04 N: [bah uh bu- but (0.9) .h °uhm n n n° 
05 E: ah you went  [this morning? 
06→N:         [uh I-       I: ↓n. .hh °n bo- 
07→  boku ni ↑(haga n) ↓(oni) ↑I my ↓me° .hh ↑me .h (.) 
    1SG  PP 
08   ↑me:↓: (0.2) me think (.) big wave. h hh 
09   [.h huh .hh          [y(h)es. huh 
10 E: [oh you think they’re big  [waves? 
11 (0.9) 
12 N: .hh  [kowai. 
        frightening 
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13 E:    [so they’re bi- they’re big for you. 
14 N: n. 
 
In line 01, Nori produces in Japanese a very mitigated agreement that the 
waves are smaller, with an agreement token (‘n’), the word ‘sukoshi’ (‘little,’ used for 
amounts), and ‘demo’ (used as a qualifier, literally ‘but’). In line 02, Eric accepts the 
downgrading by reformulating it in English, with stress on ‘little.’ Nori then starts what 
appears to be a further mitigation of his agreement in line 04, but before he can bring it 
to completion, Eric displays a new understanding of Nori’s surfing activities in line 05. 
In overlap with this, Nori first appears to continue what he started in line 04, saying ‘uh 
I’ as Eric says ‘this morning,’ and then producing a slightly elongated ‘I.’ However, he 
then responds to Eric’s new understanding with a confirmation token (‘n’). After an 
inbreath, he lowers the volume of his talk and utters what appears to be the first syllable 
of ‘boku,’ a first-person reference form in Japanese, then ‘boku ni,’ the same reference 
form followed by a postposition. This can be translated in various ways depending on 
the context, but includes ‘to me’ or ‘for me.’ He then produces a segment that is 
incomprehensible, but which appears to be in Japanese, followed by ‘I my me.’ With 
the shift up in pitch on the first item in this list and the shift down on the last, and the 
fact that it contains three parts, the sequence comes off as a complete unit. Nori then 
returns to normal volume as he repeats ‘me,’ repeats it again in elongated form at the 
start of line 08, and then, after a pause, uses it, saying ‘me think … big wave.’ In 
overlap with Nori’s laughter, Eric reformulates this in line 10 with a candidate 
understanding, which Nori confirms, while continuing to laugh, in overlap with the end 
of the reformulation. In line 12, Nori evaluates his subjective experience of the waves in 
Japanese, in overlap with which Eric provides a second reformulation of ‘me think … 
big wave’ that Nori confirms in line 14. 
What Nori appears to be doing starting in line 04 is adding to the mitigation 
of his agreement that the waves have decreased in size. What this mitigation eventually 
comes to is that he thinks the waves are big or that they are big for him. However, he 
encounters different kinds of difficulty in trying to produce this mitigation in English, 
first difficulty in finding a way to continue after ‘but’ in line 04, then difficulty caused 
by the need to respond to Eric’s display of new understanding in line 05, and finally 
difficulty in finding a way to continue after ‘I’ in line 06. He deals with this difficulty 
first by switching to Japanese. The first-person reference form that he produces, ‘boku,’ 
can be translated into English as ‘I’ or ‘me,’ depending on the context, or as ‘my,’ if 
followed by a form of the genitive marker ‘no.’ This is not the only first-person 
reference form in Japanese. There is a range of both first-person and second-person 
reference forms that index a range of social meanings, which do not change depending 
on case, and which, while generally translated into English with personal pronouns, 
function quite differently from English personal pronouns (Ono and Thompson, 2003). 
As he continues to deal with the trouble, he switches back into English. The three-part 
list of first-person pronoun forms that he produces is something that he almost certainly 
would have been taught in secondary school English class in Japan. Nori uses this list of 
forms to lead him to ‘me,’ which he is then able to use. Although ‘me think … big wave’ 
is ungrammatical, Nori is nevertheless successful in overcoming the difficulty of trying 
to further mitigate his agreement that the waves have gotten smaller. Additionally, the 
stretch of talk in Japanese and English from the end of line 06 to the first ‘me’ in line 07 
comes off as self-talk. One reason for this is its lowered volume. Another reason is that, 
even though the raised pitch on ‘I’ and the lowered pitch on ‘me’ makes this list of 
forms sound like a complete unit, Nori follows this with an inbreath and repetition of 
‘me’ with a higher pitch, both indicating that he is continuing and not treating ‘I my me’ 
as something for Eric to respond to. For his part, Eric does not attempt to respond to 
what Nori has said at a lower volume. He only responds after Nori has successfully 
produced the further mitigation of his agreement. This stretch of talk, then, in dealing 
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with difficulty and being self-talk, can be heard as private speech. 
 
Private Speech as Social Action 
    Based on the two criteria that what Nori says is oriented to overcoming some 
kind of difficulty in using his L2 and that it is self-talk, many other cases of private 
speech can be found in the data. The examples above are particularly clear cases. Based 
on these examples, I will argue in this section that the production of private speech is, in 
addition to whatever else it may be, a social action. 
Unshared Laughter as an Index of Difficulty 
    When people talk about or experience some kind of trouble or difficulty, one 
thing they may do to make light of the trouble is laugh (Glenn, 2003; Jefferson, 1984). 
While laughter is often shared, it may be inappropriate to join laughter that is being 
used in this way, as it would amount to making light of the other person’s difficulty 
(Glenn, 2003; Jefferson, 1984). This type of laughter is thus termed unshared laughter. 
For instance, in Example 2, Nori laughs after he says ‘me think … big wave,’ first in 
overlap with Eric’s reformulation of this and then as he confirms the reformulation. Eric 
does not join this laughter. One way of understanding this is that Nori is making light of 
his limited surfing skill, in that if the waves are big for him, this implies that they may 
not be big for other, more skilled surfers, so stating that the waves are big for him is an 
implicit admission of his limited surfing skill. By treating this as something to laugh at, 
a laughable (Glenn, 2003), he also shows that this is something that he is not overly 
concerned about. 
    In Example 1, Nori laughs in line 18 as he produces the possible three-part list 
of adjective forms, partially obscuring one of the forms and thus rendering ambiguous 
what he is actually trying to say. Again, Eric does not join this laughter. What Nori is 
targeting as the laughable is not completely clear, but it may be his use of this list of 
forms itself to help him find the superlative form, especially as he had just a few 
moments earlier done the same thing. Nori can this be heard as making light of his 
difficulty in finding the correct form and, by extension, of his limited proficiency in 
English. Through this unshared laughter that is part of private speech, he takes a public 
affective stance toward his English proficiency. 
Construction of Interactional Space for Private Speech 
    When Nori produces private speech, he and Eric collaborate to construct 
space within the interaction for it to occur. If the interaction is thought of as moving 
from left to right, as is shown in the English-based transcript, the left boundary of the 
interactional space is constructed through resources use to initiate self-repair (Schegloff, 
Jefferson, and Sacks, 1977); that is, pauses (Example 1, lines 09 and 17), inbreaths 
(Example 1, line 17; Example 2, line 06), ‘uh’ (Example 1, line 09), cutoff words 
(Example 1, lines 17 and 18; Example 2, line 06), and elongated words (Example 1, 
lines 17 and 18; Example 2, line 06). For his part, Eric does not attempt to intervene 
when Nori initiates self-repair. 
    Nori constructs the right boundary by using an item from the three-part list in 
the private speech as part of a larger unit addressed to Eric. This is particularly clear in 
Example 1 with ‘biggest animal’ (lines 10 and 12) and ‘oldest animal’ (lines 18 and 19). 
It can also be seen in Example 2 with ‘me think … big wave,’ but the repetition of ‘me’ 
makes the right boundary somewhat fuzzy. While Eric refrains from interfering in or 
responding to the private speech, he collaborates in constructing the right boundary by 
responding to the larger unit addressed to him. 
    While Nori’s private speech, as self-talk, is not responsive to anything in 
Eric’s talk and does not make a response relevant, a place is nevertheless constructed 
for it within the local sequential organization of the interaction. It is both designed to fit 
the sequential context and to contribute to the creation of the local context for what 
comes after the right boundary. 
Grammatical Knowledge Displayed as Three-Part Lists 
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Though this is not the only way in the complete dataset that Nori articulates 
his grammatical knowledge of English, each of the articulations of grammatical 
knowledge above is carried out as a three-part list. As shown by Jefferson (1990), 
three-part lists are not only very common in conversation (at least in English), but also 
have a normative element, in that when a specific third part is not available, it may be 
provided by a more general item (e.g., ‘and stuff’). The construction of a list structured 
as three parts is something that participants can be seen to work at and achieve in 
interaction. An interesting possibility is that three-part lists may also provide a resource 
for organizing explicit L2 grammar knowledge. It is very likely that Nori has been 
taught, possibly multiple times, the particular lists used in the examples above as 
three-part lists to be memorized and their three-part structure may be an aid to 
remembering them. Moreover, even if these lists are memorized, their production is not 
something that just happens mechanically. Rather, Nori must reproduce the list each 
time he uses it, with the reproduction itself being a mnemonic strategy. In each case, he 
reproduces the list first as a three-part list and then chooses one item, in each case the 
final item, as the one to use. He thus shows at least a limited orientation within his 
private speech to the structural normativity of three-part lists.4 
Display of Understanding of Source of Ungrammaticality 
    In Example 1, Nori’s use of private speech twice leads him to choose the 
correct form for the superlative. However, in Example 2, Nori’s private speech leads 
him to choose the accusative form of the first-person singular pronoun, which when 
serving as the subject of the verb ‘think’ results in the ungrammatical ‘me think … big 
wave.’ There are at least two, not necessarily incompatible, ways that his choice of ‘me’ 
is an understandable choice. First, it could be that as the last item in the three-part list of 
pronouns, it is the easiest one to choose. That is, the structure of the three-part list itself 
may have led him to choose the last item. Second, it could be his use of Japanese in his 
private speech that leads him to choose ‘me.’ His use of a first-person reference form 
(‘boku’) followed by a postposition (‘ni’) can be translated as ‘for me,’ ‘to me,’ or 
perhaps ‘on me,’ depending on the context. It is this second possibility that Eric appears 
to understand as the source of the choice of ‘me.’ In his second reformulation, Eric says 
‘they’re big for you,’ with stress on ‘big’ and ‘you.’ Uttered with falling intonation, it 
sounds like a candidate understanding (that is, a more or less tentative displayed 
understanding of what another has said) that Eric has more confidence in, compared 
with the first reformulation said with rising intonation. Also, while the nominative and 
accusative forms of the second-person pronoun in Standard English are identical, by 
reformulating what Nori has said in this way, Eric displays his understanding that what 
Nori was trying to say was something such as ‘the waves are big for me.’  
This second reformulation thus provides evidence that Eric has been paying 
attention to Nori’s private speech, even though he does not treat it as something that he 
should respond to directly. This is similar to what was found in Smith (2007) and 
Steinbach Kohler and Thorne (2011). The former contains examples of a participant 
responding to what the author identified as private speech, which provides the basis for 
the author’s argument that participants can treat private speech ‘as if it were social in 
social interactive contexts’ (348). In the latter, it is shown how the private speech of one 
participant related to a particular difficulty in the L2 can provide a resource for a 
different participant to identify what the difficulty is and offer assistance. Although as 
self-talk, private speech does not make a particular set of possible next actions relevant, 
it does contribute to the local context of the sequentially unfolding interaction. 
Display of Trying to Use English 
    In the quote from Goffman above, he proposed that the children that 
Vygotsky observed were using talk to show the adult observer that they were doing the 
assigned task. In these meetings between Nori and Eric, they could much more easily 
converse in Japanese. Not only is Eric a proficient L2 user of Japanese with extended 
experience of living in Japan, something which Nori is aware of, but when they 
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converse at other times and places, they do so mostly in Japanese. The purpose of these 
meetings, though, is to provide Nori with the opportunity to practice speaking English, 
while what Eric receives for providing Nori with this opportunity is data for future 
research. It is not clear how well Nori understands the uses to which this data may be 
put, but he knows that Eric is a language teacher and presumably 
understands—especially as he has given informed consent—that the data will be used to 
investigate his learning of English. 
As discussed above, the activity that Nori and Eric are engaged in can thus be 
glossed as something like ‘practicing English’ and ‘recording Nori’s English for 
research.’ Given the sort of activity, Nori is to some extent obligated to use English in 
these meetings. In fact, though, as can be seen in both examples, while Eric almost 
exclusively uses English, Nori uses a fair amount of Japanese. By using private speech 
to overcome difficulties with expressing himself in his L2 English, one thing that Nori 
accomplishes is to show that he is trying to use English. Goodwin (1987) demonstrates 
how self-talk provides resources for other participants to understand the behavior of the 
speaker, while at the same time the behavior of the speaker provides resources for 
understanding the meaning of the self-talk. In the examples above, Nori’s private 
speech contributes to constituting the activity that he and Eric are engaged in as 
‘practicing English’ and ‘recording Nori’s English for research,’ while the activity 
provides the context for understanding Nori’s private speech as showing that he is 
trying to use English. 
    Some of the ways that the private speech in the examples above can be 
understood as social action, then, include 1) that laughter is used to index and make 
light of the difficulty that the private speech is being used to overcome, and through this, 
take a public affective stance; 2) that the participants collaboratively construct space for 
the private speech in the interaction; 3) that there is an orientation by Nori to the 
structural normativity of three-part lists; 4) that the private speech is paid attention to by 
Eric, which can influence what happens subsequently; and 5) that the private speech 
shows that Nori is trying to do what he is supposed to be doing, that is, use English, 
thus contributing to what they are doing as ‘practicing English’ and ‘recording Nori’s 
English for research.’ 
 
Concluding Remarks 
    One thing that becomes apparent when reading research on private speech is 
that it is not always clear how some bit of talk has been identified as private speech. 
Even though the criteria are often clearly explained, how they are applied to identify 
particular instances is often not. While a few studies (e.g., DiCamilla and Antón, 2004; 
Steinbach Kohler and Thorne, 2011) provide examples and explain the basis for 
identifying the examples as private speech, it seems more common to provide examples 
without such explanation. In a few quantitative studies, all the data are numeric and no 
examples of private speech are provided at all. One result is that the reader must often 
accept, on the basis of such things as inter-rater reliability measures, the researcher’s 
ability to apply the criteria. As shown above, by paying careful attention to the details 
of how talk is produced in interaction, it is possible to clearly demonstrate how the 
private speech has been identified by the researcher. This provides the reader with 
resources for assessing the validity of the researcher’s claims, as opposed to the 
statistical reliability of the coding procedures.5 A weakness of the data used for this 
paper is that it is only audio data. Some research on private speech has made use of 
video data and included gesture as part of private speech (McCafferty, 1998; Lee, 2008). 
With such data, careful attention to the details of gesture, gaze, and other aspects of 
embodied practice is as important as—perhaps even inseparable from—attention to the 
details of the talk. 
    More importantly, by looking at private speech as social action, it becomes 
apparent that private speech is not just an etic category or a theoretical construct, but 
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also an action that the participants in interaction may orient to as what they are doing. 
Paying attention to the details of how private speech is produced and how it is (or rather, 
is not) responded to allows for a more emic perspective, in that it is through the details 
of their interaction that participants make visible, for one another and, incidentally, for 
the researcher, their understanding of what is happening. This lessens the risk of simply 
imposing the researcher’s theoretical commitments onto the participants’ talk 
(Schegloff, 1997). As discussed above, social actions are designed to be recognizable, 
though this should not be taken to preclude the possibility of deception and does not 
mean that participants’ understanding of what an action is cannot be revised. When a 
participant produces private speech, it is produced so as to be recognizable as private 
speech, something that researchers rely on as they attempt to identify private speech. 
    I have argued elsewhere (Hauser, 2011, 2013b) against the use of so-called 
exogenous theories of learning within a CA approach to language learning (i.e., 
CA-SLA, see Kasper and Wagner, 2011). The primary target of this argument is the use 
of a different variety of sociocultural theory, situated learning theory (Lave and Wenger, 
1991), in CA-SLA. However, the same basic argument applies to other theories of 
learning, such as Vygotskian sociocultural theory. As shown in Hauser (2013b), though, 
this does not mean that connections cannot be drawn between work in CA-SLA and 
work in other approaches. In this paper, I hope to have shown how connections may be 
drawn between work in CA-SLA and the Vygotskian approach to language learning 
(Lantolf, 2011), without, however, compromising the CA principle of avoiding a priori 
theorizing. As I see it, there are three such connections that can be drawn with regard to 
private speech. First, attention to the details of interaction and the provision of examples 
of how private speech has been identified can allow the reader to assess the validity of 
the researcher’s claims. Second, by adopting an emic perspective, it is possible to see 
what the participants themselves are doing when they produce talk (and embodied 
action) that is recognizable as private speech. Third, private speech, at least when it is 
produced within interaction, is social not just in origin, but social each time that it is 




1. This may lead, though, to an observer’s paradox, in that the participants were being 
recorded and could be thought of as producing talk and gesture for the researcher. See 
the discussion below of Goffman’s (1981) criticism of Vygotsky. 
2. See also Wittgenstein (1953) for a critique of the notion of a private language distinct 
from public language. 
3. Though they do not mention Goffman, recent experimental research in child 
development by McGonigle-Chalmers, Slater, and Smith (2013) has found that the 
amount of private speech produced by children is much greater when an observer is 
present than when an observer is absent, which supports Goffman’s interpretation. 
4. Within Vygotskian sociocultural theory, inner speech and private speech are 
described as elliptical. In these examples, though, the three-part lists are not elided. 
5. See Hauser (2005) for a critique of the use of coding in research on interaction in 
Second Language Acquisition. 
 
References 
Alarcón-Rubio, D., Sánchez-Medina, J. A., and Winsler, A. (2013). Private speech in 
illiterate adults: Cognitive functions, task difficulty, and literacy. Journal of Adult 
Development 20: 100--111. doi: 10.1007/s10804-013-9161-y 
Antón, M. and DiCamilla, F. J. (1999). Socio-cognitive functions of L1 collaborative 
interaction in the L2 classroom. The Modern Language Journal 83: 233--247. 
Damianova, M. K., Lucas, M., and Sullivan, G. B. (2012). Verbal mediation of problem 
solving in pre-primary and junior primary school children. South African Journal of 
 12 
Psychology 42: 445--455. doi:10.1177/008124631204200316 
DiCamilla, F. J. and Antón, M. (2004). Private speech: A study of language for thought 
in the collaborative interaction of language learners. International Journal of Applied 
Linguistics 14: 36--69. 
Donato, R. (2000). Sociocultural contributions to understanding the foreign and second 
language classroom. In J. P. Lantolf (ed.) Sociocultural Theory and Second Language 
Learning 27--50. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in Ethnomethodology. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Glenn, P. (2003). Laughter in Interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Goffman, E. (1981). Forms of Talk. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Goodwin, C. (1987). Unilateral departure. In G. Button and J. R. E. Lee (eds.) Talk and 
Social Organisation 206--216. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters. 
Hauser (2005). Coding ‘corrective recasts’: The maintenance of meaning and more 
fundamental problems. Applied Linguistics 26: 293--316. doi: 10.1093/applin/ami010 
Hauser, E. (2011). On the danger of exogenous theory in CA-for-SLA: A response to 
Hellermann and Cole (2009). Applied Linguistics 32: 348--352. doi: 
10.1093/applin/amr015 
Hauser, E. (2013a). Expanding resources for marking direct reported speech. In T. 
Greer, D. Tatsuki, and C Roever (eds.) Pragmatics and Language Learning, Volume 13 
29--53. Honolulu: National Foreign Language Resource Center. 
Hauser, E. (2013b). Stability and change in one adult’s second language English 
negation. Language Learning 63: 463--498. doi: 10.1111/lang.12012 
Hayano, K. (2013). Question design in conversation. In J. Sidnell and T. Stivers (eds.) 
The Handbook of Conversation Analysis 395--414. Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell. 
Heritage, J. (1984). Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Heritage, J. and Stivers, T. (2013). Conversation Analysis and sociology. In J. Sidnell 
and T. Stivers (eds.) The Handbook of Conversation Analysis 659--673. Malden, MA: 
Wiley Blackwell. 
Holtgraves, T. M. (2002). Language as Social Action: Social Psychology and Language 
Use. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Jefferson, G. (1984). On the organization of laughter in talk about troubles. In J. M. 
Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.) Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation 
Analysis 346--369. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jefferson, G. (1990). List construction as task and resource. In G. Psathas (ed.) 
Interaction Competence 63--92. Washington D.C.: University Press of America. 
Jefferson, G. (2004). A sketch of some orderly aspects of overlap in natural 
conversation. In G. H. Lerner (ed.) Conversation Analysis: Studies from the First 
Generation 13--31. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Kasper, G. and Wagner, J. (2011). A conversation-analytic approach to second language 
acquisition. In D. Atkinson (ed.) Alternative Approaches to Second Language 
Acquisition 117--142. London: Routledge. 
Lantolf, J. P. (2000). Introducing sociocultural theory. In J. P. Lantolf (ed.) 
Sociocultural Theory and Second Language Learning 1--26. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Lantolf, J. P. (2003). Intrapersonal communication and internalization in the second 
language classroom. In. A Kozulin, V. S. Ageev, S. M. Miller, and B. Grindis (eds.) 
Vygotsky’s Educational Theory in Cultural Context 349--370. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lantolf, J. P. (2011). The sociocultural approach to second language acquisition. In D. 
Atkinson (ed.) Alternative Approaches to Second Language Acquisition 24--47. 
London: Routledge. 
Lantolf, J. P. and Thorne, S. L. (2006). Sociocultural Theory and the Genesis of Second 
Language Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 13 
Lantolf, J. P. and Yáñez-Prieto, M. –d. –C. (2003). Talking to yourself in Spanish: 
Intrapersonal communication and second language learning. Hispania 86: 97--109.  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20062818 
Larrain, A. and Haye, A. (2012). The discursive nature of inner speech. Theory and 
Psychology 22: 3--22. doi: 10.1177/0959354311423864 
Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991). Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lee, J. (2008). Gesture and private speech in second language acquisition. Studies in 
Second Language Acquisition 30: 169--190. doi: 10.1017/S0272263108080303 
Maynard, D. W. (2013). Everyone and no one to turn to: Intellectual roots and contexts 
for Conversation Analysis. In J. Sidnell and T. Stivers (eds.) The Handbook of 
Conversation Analysis 11--31. Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell. 
McCafferty, S. G. (1994a). Adult second language learners use of private speech: A 
review of studies. The Modern Language Journal 78: 421--436. 
McCafferty, S. G. (1994b). The use of private speech by adult ESL learners at different 
levels of proficiency. In J. P. Lantolf and G. Appel (eds.) Vygotskian Approaches to 
Second Language Research 117--134. Westport, CN: Ablex Publishing. 
McCafferty, S. G. (1998). Nonverbal expression and L2 private speech. Applied 
Linguistics 19: 73--96. 
McGonigle-Chalmers, M., Slater, H. and Smith, A. (2013). Rethinking private speech in 
preschoolers: The effects of social presence. Developmental Psychology 50: 829--836. 
doi: 10.1037/a0033909 
Nguyen, H. t. and Kasper, G. (eds.) (2009). Talk-in-Interaction: Multilingual 
Perspectives. Honolulu, HI: National Foreign Language Resource Center. 
Ohta, A. S. (2001). Second Language Acquisition Processes in the Classroom: Learning 
Japanese. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Ono, T. and Thompson, S. A. (2003). Japanese (w)atashi/ore/boku ‘I’: They’re not just 
pronouns. Cognitive Linguistics 14: 321--347. 
Parsons, T. (1937). The Structure of Social Action. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Pomerantz, A. and Fehr, B. J. (1997). Conversation Analysis: An approach to the study 
of social action as sense making practices. In T. A. van Dijk (ed.) Discourse as Social 
Interaction 64--91. London: Sage. 
San Martín Martínez, C., Boada i Calbet, H., and Feigenbaum, P. (2011). Private and 
inner speech and the regulation of social speech communication. Cognitive 
Development 26: 214--229. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2011.05.001 
Schegloff, E. A. (1997). Whose text? Whose context? Discourse and Society 8: 
165--187. 
Schegloff, E. A., Jefferson, G. and Sacks, H. (1977). The preference for self-correction 
in the organization of repair in conversation. Language 53: 361--382. 
Sharrock, W. and Button, G. (1991). The social actor: Social action in real time. In G. 
Button (ed.) Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences 137--175. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, H. J. (2007). The social and private worlds of speech: Speech for inter- and 
intramental activity. The Modern Language Journal 91: 341--356. doi: 
10.1111/j.1540-4781.2007.00584.x 
Stafford, C. A. (2013). What’s on your mind? How private speech mediates cognition 
during initial non-primary language learning. Applied Linguistics 34: 151--172. 
doi:10.1093/applin/ams039 
Steinbach Kohler, F. and Thorne, S. L. (2011). The social life of self-directed talk: A 
sequential phenomenon? In J. K. Hall, J. Hellermann, and S. Pekarek Doehler (eds.) L2 
Interactional Competence and Development 66--92. Bristol, UK: Multilingual Matters. 
Stivers, T. (2013). Sequence organization. In J. Sidnell and T. Stivers (eds.) The 
Handbook of Conversation Analysis 191--209. Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell. 
Wells, G. (1999). Using L1 to master L2: A response to Antón and DiCamilla’s 
 14 
“Socio-cognitive functions of L1 collaborative interaction in the L2 classroom.” The 
Modern Language Journal 83: 248--254. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Wooffitt, R. (2005). Conversation Analysis and Discourse Analysis: A Comparative 
and Critical Introduction. London: Sage Publications. 
Yule, G. (1997). Referential Communication Tasks. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Appendix: Transcription Conventions and Translation Symbols 
 
Transcription conventions (based on Jefferson, 2004): 
.   falling intonation 
?   rising (questioning) intonation 
,   fall-rising (continuing) intonation 
_   flat intonation 
[   start of overlap 
]   end of overlap (not always used) 
=   continuation of a turn-at-talk across noncontiguous lines of transcript; also  
latching between turns-at-talk 
:   elongation 
-   cutoff 
>x<  relatively fast talk 
x   stress 
(.)   audible silence of less than two tenths of a second 
(0.5)  silence measured to closest tenth of a second 
(bah) best guess at mostly unintelligible talk 
(xx)  unintelligible talk, best guess at number of syllables indicated by number of x  
characters 
h   outbreath 
.h   inbreath 
(h)  laugh token within talk 
°   start or end of relatively quiet talk 
↑		 	 shift in pitch up 
↓   shift in pitch down 
→   line of special interest for analysis 
 
Translation symbols: 
1SG  first-person singular reference form (Ono and Thompson, 2003) 
IP   interactional particle (Nguyen and Kasper, 2009) 
PP  postposition 
